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Risk perceptions and attitudes to gene technology were investigated in a survey study of the 
general public (N=469) and experts (N=49). The response rate was 47 percent for the public, 
and data suggest that the results are applicable – with caution - to the population as a whole. 
For the experts, response rate was 60 percent. Gene technology was studied at increasing lev-
els of detail, from global attitudes across 10 specific applications to in-depth investigation of 
genetically modified food (GMF). It was found that reactions to gene technology were quite 
diverse. Medical and forensic applications were well accepted, GMF much less so. Moral 
aspects emerged as the most important ones in attitudes to gene technology applications. 
GMF technology was rated as the worst of 18 technologies and highly replaceable. Experts 
had a very different view but also did not see GMF as irreplaceable. Models of risk percep-
tions and attitudes with regard to policy and consumer intentions were fitted to data. It was 
found that a very large share of the variance, about 70 percent, was accounted for in the latter 
cases, while risk perception was harder to account for (about 25 – 30 percent explained vari-
ance). Traditional explanatory factors such as Dread and New Risk were very weak explana-
tory factors as compared to new approaches, which included Interfering with Nature, Moral 
value of technology and Trust in Science. Emotion (affect) played a very marginal role in 
these data; the risk attitudes and technology beliefs, which were investigated, should therefore 
be seen as the result of ideological convictions, not emotions or ignorance. Experts were 
throughout much more positive to gene technology than were members of the public. How-
ever, their attitudes and risk perceptions still showed dynamic properties similar to those 
found in the data from the public. In comparisons with recent Eurobarometer studies of atti-
tudes towards gene technology, risk emerged in the present study as a more important factor 
in attitudes, even if it tended to be less important than benefits. The models formulated for the 
present data were about twice as powerful as those in published analyses of Eurobarometer 
data.  
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1 . This study was supported by the Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation. Johnny and Lena Drottz and Caro-
line Nordlund contributed to the administration of the study.  Andrew Cook gave a valuable comment.  
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Introduction 
 
The present report is an account of an empirical study of risk perception and related attitudes 
with regard to gene technology. Both the public and experts were investigated. The frame-
work of the study builds upon our earlier extensive research on risk perception in other fields 
of application. Since this framework differs from the traditional one, some space in the intro-
ductory section is devoted to explaining the conclusions from earlier research and pointing out 
some of the shortcomings of traditional approaches.  
 
Background in risk perception research 
 
 
The controversies about modern technologies usually focus on risk, and it has been noted that 
experts and the public often have had very different notions as to risk, e.g. when it comes to 
food [20; 51; 131] . Experts tend to rate risks as lower when they refer to their area of respon-
sibility [124] . Gene technology is no exception even if systematic research on experts’ atti-
tudes has so far been scarce or lacking.  Current developments of gene technology tend to 
give rise to controversy, and the public is known to be very unwilling to accept some of the 
applications [8; 28; 32; 59] . Whether the risk focus is true also of GMOs remains to be seen. 
Recently published research based on Eurobarometer investigations tells a different story, 
putting the emphasis on benefits (or lack of them) rather than on risk [38] . Others have 
stressed risk perspectives [60] , personality in terms of general trust [90] , values [15] or cul-
tural factors [22] . Be that as it may – the issue will be treated at some length in the present 
report - GAO’s have given rise to a number of difficult questions when it comes to risk per-
ception and policy attitudes [61] .  
 
Social scientists, many of them psychologists, have conducted studies of technology risk per-
ception and attitudes for about 25 years, but as of yet, there is no consensus on what is driving 
these attitudes, or how conflict resolution can be achieved. Conflict resolution is called for 
since there is a dramatic gap between experts’ and managers’ risk perceptions and those of the 
public, and of many – but not all - politicians
2. Risk communication strategies are frequently 
proposed in order to solve the conflicts [30; 65] , but communication may have the effect of 
increasing risk awareness, no matter what its contents [79] . More knowledgeable people were 
found, in one study, to be more ambivalent about genetic testing [49] . Clearly, challenging 
and interesting questions abound when it comes to gene technology and risk attitudes.  
 
More generally, political decisions in matters of risk tend to be overly responsive to what is 
believed to be the public demands, resulting in skew allocations of resources to various safety 
programs [64; 71; 133; 136] . This is so in spite of indications that people do not really de-
mand, or accept, very skew resource allocations [72] . Politicians have, however, at times er-
roneous views of the public’s beliefs and attitudes regarding risk [94] .  
                                                 
2. Elite groups such as politicians at various levels and in various capacities, leading businessmen or journalists 
have rarely been studied, with the exception of natural science and technology experts who have been studied, in 
particular in the nuclear field. Rothman and Lichter studied a broad sampling of elite groups [74] . Sjöberg [107]  
and Rowe and Wright [75]  provide further discussion of experts’ risk perception and related attitudes. Politi-
cians in Sweden were studied by Carter et al. [10]  and by Sjöberg [94] , which are two of the few investigations 
of large and representative groups of politicians, at the municipal and regional level and specializing in risk 
management issues. They were found to have risk attitudes quite similar to those of the public.  
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Why should risk be important? We have repeatedly found risks to be more important than 
benefits [101; 116] . In related work, we found that people are more easily sensitised to risk 
than to safety [122] . Mood states have been found to be more influenced by negative expecta-
tions (risk) than by positive ones [93] . Tversky and Kahn man’s Prospect Theory of decision 
making posits that monetary losses are more abhorred than corresponding gains are desired 
[52] . People seem to be more eager to avoid risks than to pursue chances. 
 
Hence, policy making in matters of risk and hazard is very hard and it is to some extent gov-
erned by beliefs about the public’s fear and volatility of beliefs, driven by such external 
events as foreign accidents and disasters. These political beliefs have seemingly been sup-
ported by social and behavioral research on the public’s risk perception, carried out mainly in 
the USA, since the end of the 1970's. This work is described and discussed in the following 
sections.  
 
The received view of risk perception 
 
The field of risk perception research was given stimulation by the work by Tversky and Kah-
neman on heuristics [92; 139]  and by a seminal paper by Fischhoff et al. in 1978 [25] . This 
paper established what was to become a paradigmatic approach to risk perception, called the 
Psychometric Model. The main conclusion from research using this model is that the public’s 
risk perception is driven by emotional reactions (often referred to as dread or “gut feelings”) 
and ignorance (judging the risk to be new and unknown). The view that emotions play a 
dominating role is still a major part of the received view of risk perception, as witnessed in a 
recent theoretical analysis by Loewenstein et al. [57] . In other work, it has become clear that 
general factors such as novelty carry little explanatory power and that more specific analysis 
is called in any modeling the perceive risk of any major hazard such as nuclear waste [115]  
or terrorism [119] .  
 
Further main theses of the received view are that experts make “objective” risk judgments 
uncontaminated, as it were, by the “emotional” factors characteristic of the public’s attitudes, 
and that risk perception directly drives risk policy attitudes [24; 128] . Indeed, a distinction 
between risk perception and policy attitudes is rarely made.  It is commonly argued that the 
risk perception gap between experts and the public needs to be eliminated and to do so we 
must establish (social) trust [127; 130] .  
 
In the original work on risk perception, and much of the later one as well, no risk target was 
specified. Respondents were simply asked to judge “risk”, and were not told to whom the risk 
would pertain. It is clear, however, that risks are judged differently when pertaining to one’s 
own person (personal risk) or to others (general risk)
3. In most cases, personal risk is judged 
as smaller than general risk; a finding related to unrealistic optimism affecting health related 
beliefs, as documented by Weinstein [141; 142] . The two types of risk also have different 
correlates, general risk being related to policy attitudes especially for lifestyle hazards (smok-
ing, drinking alcohol, etc) [112] .  
 
Slovic and other researchers went on to formulate, in the 1980's, a “stigma theory” which pos-
its that hazardous facilities or technologies create a stigma of an area, leading to loss of eco-
nomic opportunities and also to people living there being ostracized in the wider society [27] . 
                                                 
3 . When no target is specified, people seem to judge general rather than personal risks [112] . 
  6The most recent work in the Psychometric Paradigm claims that “affect” is important in driv-
ing perceived risk [21; 57] . 
 
Experts have been investigated, to a limited extent [24; 128] . On the basis of a very small 
sample of risk analysts (N=12), it was concluded that experts make “objective” risk judg-
ments, unaffected by factors, which were found to be important in the case of the public 
(dread, novelty). This early work was critically assessed only recently [75; 107] . Apart from 
the sample being very small, the studied risk analysts could not have had expertise in all of 
the many and very varied topics investigated, from nuclear power plants to mountain climb-
ing.  
 
Summing up, risk perception work appeared to imply that the public reacts emotionally, and 
out of ignorance, with regard to their risk perceptions. Experts were said, in contrast to the 
public, to be objective and correct in their risk perceptions, which are not contaminated by 
emotions and other biasing factors. Trust in experts could re-establish the gap between the 
experts and the public; trust being a very important factor in perceived risk. This work has 
enjoyed a widespread credibility, in spite of serious weaknesses, which I now briefly review. 
 
Critique of the received view 
 
The present report relies on a different view of risk perception than the received one. There 
are several reasons for this choice of different theoretical and methodological framework. 
Eight critical points against the received view will be made here
4: 
 
1. The psychometric model seemed to be very powerful in accounting for perceived risk and 
risk acceptance, but that was an illusion, based on misleading data analysis [108] . Mean val-
ues were used in regression analyses. When raw data and individual differences were ana-
lysed, amount of explained variance dropped from about 70 to 20 percent [36] . Considerable 
improvement has been achieved by introducing new factors in the original model, such as 
Interfering with Nature [104] . Another important factor, related to Interfering with Nature, is 
that of moral value [126] . Man-made disasters are reacted to very differently from natural 
disasters, in part because there is nobody to blame for natural disasters [45] .  
 
2. The original work on “dread” did not measure only emotion, but mainly judgments of the 
severity of consequences of an accident [114] . The dread item has turned out to have less 
explanatory value than the items measuring severity of consequences. Only recently, more 
emotion items have been introduced in the models [56] .  
 
3. The notion that “new risk” is very important in accounting for perceived risk has not been 
supported in current research [110; 116] . Novelty of a risk is a very marginal factor in risk 
perception.  
 
4. “Stigma” has never been established as a factor, except as a post hoc explanation of a few 
cases. Stigma theory cannot be used to predict events, nor can it explain the large prevalence 
of non-stigma cases (the vast majority with regard to nuclear facilities) [5; 9] .  
 
                                                 
4 . Cultural theory of risk perception [14]  could also be said to be part of the received view, since it is often 
mentioned as the background for “world views” being important determinants of perceived risk, see e.g. Peters 
and Slovic [69] . However, the explanatory power of Cultural Theory dimensions is minuscule [95]  and I there-
fore chose not to discuss it at length in the present context.  
  75. Current beliefs that “affect” (emotion) is an important factor in risk perception are mainly 
based on the fact, well known in other literature [103; 105] , that attitude tends to be strongly 
correlated with perceived risk. Researchers within the Psychometric Paradigm chose to use 
the word affect for what is more appropriately called attitude, thus giving rise to the erroneous 
belief that they had shown that emotions influenced risk perceptions [120] . 
 
6. The belief that risk policy attitudes are based on perceived risk misses at least two impor-
tant qualifications. First, policy attitudes are based on perceived or expected consequences of 
e.g. an accident, not its risk (which is mainly interpreted as probability) [99; 102] . Probability 
tends to be ignored [134] . Second, attitude to a technology is largely based on beliefs regard-
ing its benefits and whether it is indispensable or not, if viable alternatives exist [109; 114] . 
 
7. Social trust is fairly marginal when it comes to accounting for perceived risk [100; 144] . 
Trust in the value of science is frequently more important [106] . People may well think that 
experts are honest and competent, yet that their scientific basis is insufficiently well devel-
oped [17; 18] , as Drottz-Sjöberg found in her work on attitudes, following the two local re-
pository referenda that have been held in Sweden.  More research is needed, in the eyes of 
many, or they even reject the value of science and opt for other notions of knowledge, such as 
those offered by New Age proponents. In studies especially oriented towards New Age beliefs 
and worldviews, it was found that such beliefs account for some 10-15 percent of the variance 
of risk perception [113; 121] .  
 
8. While experts tend to give lower risks estimates than the public, in their own area of exper-
tise and responsibility, the structure of their risk perceptions is similar to that of the public’s 
[107] . 
 
Research on attitudes toward gene technology 
 
Siegrist and Bühlmann [89]  performed a multidimensional scaling of various gene technol-
ogy applications and found two factors: type of application (food vs. medicine) and plants vs. 
animals. The first factor appeared to be the most important one for technology acceptance, 
which was low for food and high for medicine, cp. Zechendorf [145] . Positive attitudes to 
medical applications of gene technology are rather common [6] . Frewer, Howard and Shep-
herd found low acceptance of genetically engineered food, perceived benefits counteracting 
this tendency, as well as perceived "naturalness" [31; 34] . Frewer et al. stressed the variation 
of responses to different technologies.  Fischhoff and Fischhoff also stressed the varying re-
sponses to different types of biotechnology [23] . 
 
Other variables correlating with perceived risk and acceptance of gene technology were 
worldviews [86] , gender and environmental attitudes [85]  and moral concerns [135] . Trust 
has often been mentioned as an important variable [87] . Eiser, Miles and Frewer found evi-
dence against the notion of trust and/or risk being factors causally related to technology ac-
ceptance [19] . They suggested that trust, risk and acceptance all reflected similar notions.  
 
Siegrist's work on trust is interesting but his conclusions tend to be somewhat misleading. 
First, some of the work shows fairly modest relationships between trust and risk perception, 
some 15-20 explained variance, which is quite in line with most other work on this issue. 
Second, in some applications the amount of explained variance was much higher, but in those 
cases perceived risk and trust were both measured by attitude scale items that were formally 
similar, having the same response scale (agree - disagree, a so-called Likert scale). In a spe-
  8cial methodological study I recently obtained the same result [109] . When perceived risk and 
trust both are measured by rating scales, the usual methodology, the relationship was found to 
be modest, about 15 percent explained variance. However, when both dimensions were meas-
ured by means of attitude scale items using the same response format, the explained variance 
was drastically increased to 30. One may ask, of course, which methodology gives the most 
valid information about strength of relationship.  
 
Skeptical attitudes to some applications of gene technology seem to be more common in 
Europe [88]  than in the USA [39; 62] . The US public may still be relatively little concerned 
[58] . Madsen et al. point out that European consumers see little or no benefit to them from 
the use of GMF, while American producers may profit greatly. A large minority of farmers in 
New Zeeland were found to be oriented towards the use of GM technology and intense pro-
duction methods. Economic factors may benefit such farmers. Possibly, media reports about 
new hazards have also played an important role here [33; 67] , possibly because they give rise 
to fear [55] . At the same time, increased negative media coverage, starting in the end of the 
1990’s seemed to be bringing out worry and concern among sectors of the American public 
[82] .  
 
Much of the work on gene technology is of the type opinion polling rather than attitude re-
search, e.g. some of the Eurobarometer work sponsored by the EU. For example, Euro-
barometer 46.1 reported that people had little knowledge about and were negative towards 
biotechnology (data collected in 1996) [7] , and subsequent work (Eurobarometer 52.1) has 
verified these findings [37] .  Moral issues, and “unnatural” risk, emerged as important as-
pects, and attitudes appeared to be declining [40] . 
 
The survey questions used in the Eurobarometer program may be partly hard to understand 
for the lay public who is apparently expected to understand the meaning of such scientific 
terms as “stem cell” or “cloning”.  In addition, relatively few questions are asked and in-depth 
understanding of attitudes is consequently hard to achieve. It should also be noted that only a 
relatively modest level of explained variance was reached.  
 
Pardo, Midden and Miller [68]  suggested a broad approach to gene technology attitudes (per-
ceived risks and benefits) but did not devise a model of attitudes.They did construct models of 
perceived benefits and risks. The risk models failed to explain perceived risk, not even gender 
came out as an important explanatory factor. Only 5 percent of the perceived risk variance 
was accounted for. The benefit model explained 33 percent of the variance, mainly on the 
basis of educational level, knowledge, and general and specific technology optimism. Sava-
dori et al. [78]  reported a higher level of explained variance of gene technology risks, on the 
basis of risk dimensions of the type used in the Psychometric Model. Their models achieved, 
on the average, about 40 percent explained variance. However, the sample of non-experts was 
a small convenience sample of 58 persons (not described in any detail) and a regression model 
using 15 explanatory variables would seem to be questionable in their case. 
 
Gaskell et al. reported models of attitude to GM food [38] , also based on Eurobarometer data, 
which reached a maximum of 27 percent explained variance. Their most powerful model in-
cluded an interaction term reflecting a stronger effect of risk for respondents who saw a high 
degree of benefit of GM food. The main message of their article is that risk is not the major 
factor in GM food attitude, but benefit. However, both risk and benefit contributed to the ex-
planation of attitude in their data, even if benefit was more important than risk. A qualitative 
approach was attempted by Verdurme and Viaene [143] .  
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Thus, the few previous attempts at modeling factors in risk perceptions and attitudes toward 
gene technology have thus resulted only in fairly moderate power, as measured by the amount 
of variance accounted for. The main reason for this fact is probably that several factors known 
to be of potential importance, on the basis of previous work on other technologies, were not 
measured and applied in the models. I mention especially epistemological trust, morality and 
interference with Nature, a factor that borders on religious beliefs and New Age convictions.  
 
The purpose of the present study was to investigate attitudes to gene technology in depth, with 
a special focus on moral issues and risk attitudes. This work relies on our previous risk per-
ception research, and it was designed to test and further develop the models of risk perception 
and attitudes, which have emerged over the last three decades. In particular, we apply a con-
ceptual structure different from the received view due to Slovic and others and show how risk 
attitudes emerge according to ideological rather than emotional or affective themes.  Close 
attention to the many varieties of risk and worry questions is called for, since there are several 
dimensions of such questions which may have large effects not intuitively obvious [109] . 
 
It was important to study the opinions and beliefs of the non-experts members of the general 
public. However, it was also considered to be of interest to include a group of gene technol-
ogy experts. It was noted above that the received view of experts as fully objective and quali-
tatively different from non-experts has recently been found to be unjustified. However, we 
know of no previous study comparing gene technology experts with non-experts with regard 
to risk perception and related beliefs. Such a study is called for, because a gap between the 
two groups constitutes the basis for serious policy conflicts. It was the purpose of the present 
study to investigate the possible gap between experts and non-experts in order to inform pol-
icy on this matter and to form the basis for further work on risk communication and policy.  
 
Summing up, the present study was carried out in order to describe main aspects of risk per-
ceptions and attitudes of gene technology, and to model these data in terms of driving factors 
at the level of individual respondents. The differences between members of the public and 
experts were investigated and it was expected that experts would be much more positive to 
and see fewer risks of gene technology than members of the public. The explanatory con-
structs measured were based on our previous work, which has been oriented towards finding 
powerful factors behind risk perceptions. It was expected that similar factors would work well 








5, 27 pages in A5 format, was mailed to 1000 persons living in 
Sweden in September 2003. The names and addresses had been selected at random from the 
national population file administered by SPAR-DAFA. Incentives in the form of lottery tick-
ets were promised to respondents. Two reminders were sent. The same questionnaire, minus a 
few sections and with some added background questions, was sent to 109 persons tentatively 
                                                 
5 , Available at http//:www.dynam-it.com/institute (see tab “gene technology study”) 
  10identified
6 as experts in the field of gene technology, in March 2004. Two reminders were 




The design of the questionnaire sent to the public was as follows: 
 
-  11 initial questions dealing with attitude to gene technology in general 
-  10 sections dealing with different specific applications of gene technology: 
o  Modification of animal genes in pharmaceutical industry 
o  Modification of plant genes in pharmaceutical industry 
o  Modification of animal genes in food industry 
o  Modification of plant genes in food industry 
o  Gene diagnostics in family planning when there are reasons to suspect injury 
o  Gene diagnostics of a foetus to inform an abortion decision when there are rea-
sons to suspect injury 
o  Gene diagnostics of a foetus in connection with “test tube” reproduction, to in-
form a decision about inserting a foetus in the uterus 
o  Modification of human body cells in order to counteract illness 
o  Modification of human sex cells in order to counteract illness 
o  The use of gene technology by the police in their work to find the perpetrator 
of a certain crime 
Each of these 10 sections asked for 5 ratings of the technology in question, on 5-category 
scales. These ratings asked whether the technology was 
 
o  Good, on the whole 
o  Morally correct 
o  Useful 
o  Risky 
o  Associated with acceptable risk 
-  A section calling for rating 46 hazards in terms of personal risk, on category scales 
from 0 (no risk at all) to 7 (a very large risk) 
-  The same 46 hazards rated in terms of risk to people in general 
-  5 sections calling for the assessment of 18 technologies in terms of: 
o  Should they be used more or less or kept at the present level 
o  Risk 
o  Moral status (acceptable – unacceptable) 
o  Utility 
o  If they could be replaced by other technology or were irreplaceable 
-  A section calling for judging 19 psychometric aspects of GM foods 
-  55 attitude statements concerning GM foods 
-  9 statements measuring New Age beliefs 
-  6 fact statements, to be judged as true or false, concerning genetics and gene technol-
ogy 
-  8 ratings of trust in various organizations or groups 
-  13 statements measuring general suspiciousness 
                                                 
6 . Names and addresses were obtained from several knowledgeable informants. Most of the people approached 
were associated with universities or government research institutes, but a few were employed by industry. For 
reasons of respondent integrity, no data on institutional association were entered in the file, and all responses 
were anonymous.  
  11-  Background questions, including interest in technology, GM food and illness experi-
ence, assessment of the environmental situation in the world and the role of technol-
ogy in that connection, a question tapping attitudes to the precautionary principle, 
place of residence, vegetarianism, political preference, knowledge of Swedish, if the 
respondent was the person who had received the questionnaire, if he or she had an-
swered individually, as instructed, and interest in taking part in further studies 
-  10 dimensions for rating the quality of the questionnaire and the study 
-  Time needed to complete the questionnaire 
-  Space was finally provided for written comments 
 
The questionnaire sent to the experts was quite similar to the one sent to the public, with three 
exceptions: 
 
-  The New Age questions were deleted. 
-  The questions measuring general suspiciousness were deleted. 
-  The questions about elementary facts were deleted. 
-  A few background questions about academic credentials and degree of expertise were 
added, and some questions about willingness to take part in further studies, and the 
like, were deleted. 
 
The total number of items of the questionnaire was 383. The median time to fill out the ques-
tionnaire, by the public sample, was still not excessive, 40 minutes. The time reported by the 
experts (median) was 35 minutes. 
 
There was an unusually positive response to a question about taking part in a new study; 
about 60 percent said they would do so
7. There were 10 questions about the quality of the 
questionnaire; positive and negative answers were distributed as in Table 1. 
 
                                                 
7 . A new study was later sent to a subsample that had indicated willingness, about 80 percent responded (no 
reminder was used). The topic was quite different from the gene technology study.  
  12Note. 1. The columns do not sum to 100 because there was also a category of “doubtful” responses, see Appen-
dix for these data.  
Table 1. Quality assessments of the questionnaire and the study
1.  







perts  Public  Ex-
perts 
Do you find the study meaningful?  73.8 59.6  5.7  4.3 
Were the questions clearly formulated?  73.3 52.3  7.8  13.6 
Were the response alternatives clearly formulated?  78.9 55.5  5.5  8.9 
Did the questionnaire bring up what is important in 
this context?  81.7 75.0  2.0  2.3 
Do you feel that we tried, with the questionnaire, to 
influence your responses in a certain direction?  66.0 77.9 10.6  6.6 
Has the questionnaire made you interested in getting 
more information about the topics?  39.4 4.4 28.7 62.2 
Has the questionnaire made you worried about the 
risks, which it treats?  50.7 93.3 25.1  0.0 
Was it an interesting task to fill out the questionnaire?  52.3 34.8 22.2  39.2 
Were the text easy to ready and the layout clear?  78.6 71.8  7.8  13.1 
Were there many questions, which you found unneces-
sary?  34.8 34.9 33.7  32.6 
 
The evaluations of the study and the questionnaire can thus be seen to be, overall, positive. In 
particular, few aspects seem to have been missed, according to the views of the respondents 
and the study was clearly seen as meaningful.  
 
The experts made similar assessments of the questionnaire, only somewhat less positive; see 
Table 1. It can be noted, in particular, that the experts were more prone to find some questions 
and formulations to be unclear. This is a common finding in a group of experts and is proba-
bly partly caused by their having much more, and much more detailed, knowledge of the 
field. They want nuances where the public would not have appreciated them. Exactly the 
same questions to experts and the public were a necessity, however, in order for meaningful 






Filled out questionnaires were returned by 469 persons, yielding a response rate of 47.8 per-
cent. (Nineteen addresses were unusable). There was also about 2 percent internal data loss 
since not all respondents answered to all questions.  
 
There was an even gender distribution among the respondents in the public sample: 49.3 per-
cent male and 50.7 percent female (see Appendix for this and subsequent response distribu-
tions). The age distribution was quite similar to national statistics, with a few percentage units 
too few in the youngest age groups. There was a bias with regard to education; 8 percentage 
units too many had college or graduate education. With regard to place of residence, there 
were a few percentage units too few respondents from the four largest cities and from purely 
  13rural areas. The proportion of vegetarians was 2 percent, as compared to 5 percent in the 
population according to our information. The political preferences of the respondents were in 
good agreement with polls conducted during the same time.  
 
About 14 percent of the public sample answered a question about their knowledge of Swedish 
with some hesitation about how well they knew the language; this figure resembles the num-
ber of immigrants in the country, which is at that level. Only a few percent indicated that they 
were not the person the survey had been addressed to or that they had filled out the question-
naire after discussions with others.  
 
A check was made on the importance of educational level, since this was the only salient 
source of possible bias. Educational level was scored in 5 categories, and correlated with atti-
tude to gene technology (good – bad on a 7 step scale, see below), risk of gene technology 
(also a 7 step scale), and moral acceptability of gene technology (another 7 step scale). The 
resulting correlations were quite small: 0.20, 0.08 and 0.14, indicating that people with a 
higher level of education tended to be somewhat more positive to gene technology than oth-
ers, and to judge the risk as slightly lower. The effects were however quite weak, so the edu-
cation bias factor can therefore be largely ignored. If any effect can be discerned it is that, the 
present sample gives a somewhat too positive picture of the general population’s views re-




Sixty-five of the 109 experts answered, so the response rate in that group was higher than in 
the public: 59.6 percent. Of the 65 respondents, 16 were deleted because they checked, in a 
question about their degree of expertise, that they were not experts of gene technology. 
Hence, all data analysis of the expert group was based on 49 respondents.  
 
Experts were predominantly male: 69 percent. They were also older than the public sample, 
the most common category being 55-64 years, and none younger than 35. Eighty-eight per-
cent had a Ph. D. or its equivalent
8. The year they got their Ph. D. varied between 1961 and 
2000. Their faculty association was dominated by Natural Science, Medicine and Veterinary 
Medicine. These categories comprised 87 percent of the respondents; the few remaining re-
ported either Social Science or Humanities as their faculty association. Sixty-five percent had 
published 21 or more scientific articles; only two had no such publications. Twenty-nine per-
cent reported formal competence as a “docent” (associate professor), 46 percent as full pro-
fessor.  
 
Their self-assessed degree of expertise in some area of gene technology was rather or very 
large in 72 percent of the cases and their self-assessed degree of knowledge of the current 
scientific development of gene technology was reported as rather or very good by 96 percent.  
                                                 
8 . This number includes regular Ph. D’s and a few who had a “licentiate” degree, which is somewhere in be-
tween an M. Sc. and a Ph. D.  




Interests and attitudes to the environment and technology 
 
About 30 percent of the public sample indicated that they had little or no interest in science 
and technology in general; none of the experts did so. Many more, almost 60 percent, said 
they had no interest in gene technology; again, none of the experts chose those alternatives. 
On the other hand, few (19 percent) had no interest in the risks, or benefits (27 percent) of 
gene technology. A few of the experts (6 percent) had no interest in the possible risks; all of 
them were interested in the benefits.  
 
The respondents were quite pessimistic about the global environmental situation. Almost half 
of the public said it was deteriorating drastically. Many of them, 63 percent, regarded tech-
nology as responsible. The experts were just as pessimistic about the environment and tech-
nology in general. This is interesting, confirming earlier work, which showed experts to be as 
concerned as the public about risks outside their own field of responsibility – but not neces-
sarily inside their field of expert knowledge [123] . 
 
Very few (14 percent) among the public saw it as acceptable to take rather or very large risks 
in order to profit from technology. Experts were more likely to accept some risks if benefits 
could be expected, see Table 2.  
 
Hence, this version of the precautionary principle was more acceptable to the public than the 
experts, even if few among the public espoused it in its most extreme form.  
 
Table 2. What is your general opinion of the risks and 
benefits of technology? Percent within groups 
   GROUP 
   Public Experts 
No risks whatever should be taken. Re-
gardless of benefits  13.7 4.5 
  








Even rather large risks can be taken if 
there are benefits 
13.1 20.5 
  
Even very large risks can be taken if there 
are benefits 
1.1 0.0  
Total  100.0 100.0 
 
  15Questions about attitude, risk and morality of gene technology in 
general 
 
Starting with gene technology questions, it should first be noted that respondents indicated 
that they had little knowledge about this technology, see Table 3.  These data are in good 
agreement with American data, showing that about 20 percent of the population claimed, in 
1996-97, that they were totally ignorant about genetic testing [91] . Experts naturally rated 
their knowledge at a much higher level.  
 
Table 3. How large is your knowledge about gene 
technology? Response distributions in percent. 
  GROUP 
  Public Experts 
Extremely large  0.4 14.9 
Very large  0.6 44.7 
Rather large  7.6 36.2 
Neither large nor small  26.1 4.3 
Rather small  31.1 0.0 
Very small  20.7 0.0 
None at all  13.4 0.0 
Total  100.0 100.0 
 
Attitudes, ratings of good vs. bad on 7-step scales, were quite different depending on whether 
technology was used to change genes or for diagnostic purposes, see Fig. 1 for gene modifica-
tion and Fig. 2 for diagnostics (“studying the properties of genes in humans, animals and 
plants”).  As can be seen in the two figures, there were very large differences in attitude be-
tween the experts and the public. The experts were clearly quite positive to gene technology, 
while most members of the public had a more reserved attitude (only rather positive or neu-
tral), and some members of the public were outspokenly negative.  
 
Almost half of the respondents from the public (47 percent) said they were worried about 
gene technology, at least to some extent. Only 9 percent of the experts had some degree of 
worry. Even more, 70 percent, of the public responded that there were rather large, or larger, 
risks of gene technology; for experts the figure was 21 percent. There is an interest in relating 
these two questions, since opinion polls often ask about worry rather than risk. The correla-
tion was 0.58 for both the public and the experts - high and significant but by no means per-
fect, a common finding [77; 98] .  In response to a question about utility, many respondents 
from the public (62 percent) stated that there was at least rather large utility of gene technol-
ogy.  For experts, the figure was 94 percent. A large minority among the public, 24 percent, 
found this technology morally unacceptable (none of the experts), at least to some extent, 67 
percent found it frightening (9 percent of the experts). Fright, a more specific emotion than 
worry, correlated 0.63 with risk among the public, i.e. even higher than worry, with a lower 
value for the experts (0.47). 
 
There was a sceptical attitude regarding the activities of authorities to protect us from possible 
risks of gene technology. Only small groups in the public were confident about regulations 
and the activities of the authorities (values for the experts within parentheses) 
 
  16- 25 (71) percent were confident about the sufficiency of present Swedish laws and regula-
tions 
- 20 (60) percent were confident about the activities of Swedish authorities 
- 12 (63) percent were confident about EU activities in this respect 
 
It can be noted that the sceptical or outright negative views were hardly the result of direct 
personal experience. Only 4 percent suspected that they had become ill from eating geneti-
cally modified food. One expert stated having such a suspicion.  
 
The present section can be summarized as follows: 
 
-  The members of the public had little self-assessed knowledge of gene technology, 
while experts were on the other hand quite confident about their knowledge of the 
field. 
 
-  The public had a slightly positive or neutral attitude towards gene technology, with 
large groups who were outspokenly negative. Experts were overwhelmingly positive. 
 
There was, in the group from the public, much scepticism about the authorities, Swedish and 
European, and their ability to manage gene technology risks. Experts showed some scepti-
cism, but the over-all picture was one of strong trust. 
  17Fig. 1. Distributions of ratings of attitude to gene modification































Fig. 2. Distributions of ratings of attitudes to gene diagnostics

































Specific applications of gene technology 
 
Ten applications of gene technology were studied, each of them judged in five dimensions. 
The data are available in detail in the table appendix. Here, the moral judgment results are 
reported in Tables 4-13. All chi-square tests for differences between experts and the public 
were highly significant, p<0.0005, except for modification of genes in sex cells and the use of 
DNA technology in police work, where there was no significant difference between the two 
groups.  
    
  18Table 4. “There are now scientific methods to change the 
genes of animals. They can be used in the pharmaceutics 
industry. What is your opinion, overall, of that technology 
and its applications? Is it in your view morally correct?” 
Percent within groups.  
   GROUP 
   Public Experts 
To a large extent  8.4 42.2 
  
To a certain extent  22.6 46.7 
  
Doubtful  37.6 4.4 
  
Hardly at all  14.0 4.4 
  
Absolutely not  17.4 2.2 




    
Table 5. “There are now scientific methods to change the 
genes of plants. They can be used in the pharmaceutics in-
dustry. What is your opinion, overall, of that technology 
and its applications? Is it in your view morally correct?” 
Percent within groups.  
   GROUP 
   Public Experts 
To a large extent  23.7 68.9 
  
To a certain extent  37.0 28.9 
  
Doubtful  28.2 0.0  
  
Hardly at all  3.8 2.2 
  
Absolutely not  7.2 0.0  
Total  100.0 100.0 
 
 
In the case of the pharmaceutics industry, both experts and the public thus tended to accept 
that gene technology applications were morally acceptable, especially when applied to plants. 
Yet, the difference between the two groups was considerable, experts being much more ac-
cepting of this type of application.  
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Table 6. There are now scientific methods to change the 
genes of animals. They can be used in the food industry. 
What is your opinion, overall, of that technology and its 
applications? Is it in your view morally correct?” Percent 
within groups.  
   GROUP 
   Public Experts 
To a large extent  2.9 22.2 
  





Hardly at all  17.0 6.7 
  
Absolutely not  37.3 4.4 
Total  100.0 100.0 
 
 
    
Table 7. “There are now scientific methods to change the 
genes of plants. They can be used in the food industry. 
What is your opinion, overall, of that technology and its 
applications? Is it in your view morally correct?” Percent 
within groups. 
   GROUP 
   Public Experts 
To a large extent  14.5 60.0 
  
To a certain extent  26.9 31.1 
  
Doubtful  32.3 4.4 
  
Hardly at all  8.9 2.2 
  
Absolutely not  17.3 2.2 
Total  100.0 100.0 
 
 
In the case of the food industry, there were serious moral objections among the public, less so 
among the experts. The difference was, again, very large between the two groups. However, 
even the experts had some doubts as to the moral status of gene modification of animals in the 
food industry. It can also be noted that as many as about 40 percent of the members of the 
public sample apparently felt that gene modification of plants in the food industry was at least 
partly acceptable from a moral point of view.  
 
For an overview of the results, see Fig. 3 
 
  20Fig. 3. Proportions indicating full moral acceptance 
of gene technology in pharmaceutics and food industries,


































It is interesting to see that the same trend is true for both groups with regard to animal appli-
cations, but that the levels of acceptance were dramatically different. Experts were much more 
likely to see the applications as morally acceptable. For plants, experts were almost as likely 
to morally accept food as pharmaceutics applications. It should be noted that experts and the 
public ranked the four applications as to moral acceptability in the same way: 
 
-  Plants, pharmaceutics 
-  Plants, food 
-  Animals, pharmaceutics 
-  Animals, food 
 
It can thus be said that the main factor in moral judgment is that which distinguishes plants 
from animals, while the specific use – pharmaceutics or food – is secondary.  
 
Three applications had to do with reproduction and family planning: 
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Table 8. “What is your opinion about the use of gene di-
agnostics as a basis for counselling about planning to have 
a child, in cases where there is reason to expect damage? 
Is it in your view morally correct?” Percent within 
groups.  
   GROUP 
   Public Experts 
To a large extent  13.5 54.3 
  
To a certain extent 
30.9 30.4 
  
Doubtful  32.3 6.5 
  
Hardly at all  10.5 4.3 
  
Absolutely not  12.8 4.3 
Total  100.0 100.0 
 
 
   
Table 9. What is your opinion about the use of gene diag-
nostics of a foetus as a basis for deciding about abortion, 
in cases where there is reason to expect damage?  Is it in 
your view morally correct? Percent within groups.  
   GROUP 
   Public Experts 
To a large extent  13.3 47.8 
  
To a certain extent  28.3 32.6 
  
Doubtful  34.6 10.9 
  




Total  100.0 100.0 
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Table 10. “What is your opinion about the use of gene di-
agnostics of a foetus in connection with "test-tube concep-
tion", as a basis for deciding about introducing a foetus in 
the uterus, in cases where there is reason to expect dam-
age? Is it in your view morally correct?” Percent within 
groups.  
   GROUP 
   Public Experts 
To a large extent  12.8 34.8 
  
To a certain extent 
25.4 30.4 
  
Doubtful  32.5 26.1 
  




Total  100.0 100.0 
 
 
There was a higher level of acceptance in “normal” reproduction cases, see Tables 8 and 9. It 
was especially high among the group of experts, while the public showed much hesitation. In 
the “test-tube” case, even experts hesitated to some extent. The relation between what is natu-
ral and what is morally acceptable may be behind these data. It is possibly an example of a 
similar kind of thinking, which is behind notions as to “pure” and “impure” foods in religious 
beliefs [13] .  
 
Two applications concerned the treatment and prevention of illnesses, see Tables 11 and 12.  
  
 
Table 11. “There is a hope to mitigate some illnesses by 
introducing new genes in human body cells, which cannot 
be developed into sex cells. In such cases, the new genes will 
not be transferred to future generations. What do you 
think about such changes in human body cells? Is it in your 
view morally correct?” Percent within groups. 
   GROUP 
   Public Experts 
To a large extent  17.8 71.7 
  
To a certain extent  32.3 21.7 
  
Doubtful  31.7   
  
Hardly at all  5.7 2.2 
  
Absolutely not  12.5 4.3 
Total  100.0 100.0 
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Table 12. “There is currently hope to cure some illnesses by 
introducing new genes in human sex cells. Such changes will 
be transferred to future generations. What do you think 
about such changes in human sex cells? Is it in your view 
morally correct?” Percent within groups. 
   GROUP 
   Public Experts 
To a large extent  13.2 19.6 
  
To a certain extent  25.9 26.1 
  
Doubtful  30.9 26.1 
  
Hardly at all  9.8 6.5 
  
Absolutely not  20.2 21.7 
Total  100.0 100.0 
 
 
It is interesting to see that experts had some doubts when it came to introducing new genes in 
human sex cells. Otherwise, these medical applications were fairly well accepted.  
 
The final specific application concerned forensic use of gene technology: 
 
    
Table 13. “Gene technology can be used by police in their 
work to find the perpetrator of a certain crime (DNA analy-
sis). What is your opinion about the police using that tech-
nology? Is it in your view morally correct?” Percent within 
groups. 
   GROUP 
   Public Experts 
To a large extent  73.9 91.5 
  
To a certain extent  20.2 8.5 
  
Doubtful  4.8 0.0  
  
Hardly at all 
.7 0.0  
  
Absolutely not  .5 0.0  
Total  100.0 100.0 
 
 
Clearly, both experts and the public found this use of gene technology to be quite acceptable 
from a moral point of view. The result is seemingly inconsistent with Eurobarometer results 
and will be further commented on in the concluding discussion section.  
 
Summing up, there are several interesting trends in these data. First, food industry applica-
tions were seen as of little use, risky and morally questionable. Second, medical applications 
were much better accepted even if there were, even in that case, some second thoughts as to 
risk and morality. “Normal” reproduction (family planning and abortion) questions led to a 
  24higher degree of moral acceptance than a “test-tube” case. Finally, forensic use was highly 
acceptable.  
 
Data on rejection of the technologies, i.e. the number of respondents who said that an applica-
tion of gene technology was hardly or absolutely not good, varied greatly. However, even the 
highest value, for animal gene modification in the food industry, was less than a majority, 
only 39.2 percent.  
 
Moral acceptance of the ten applications was related to utility, risk and acceptability of risk, 
see Tables 14 and 15 for the public and experts, respectively.  
 
 
Table 14. Results of regression analyses of moral acceptability of the ten applications of 
gene technology, data from the public. 
  Standardized regression coefficients 




Changing animal genes, 
in pharmaceutics in-
dustry 
0.506 -0.287  0.185 0.492 
Changing plant genes, 
in pharmaceutics in-
dustry 
0.572 -0.266  0.225 0.579 
Changing animal genes, 
in food industry 
0.602 -0.204  0.175 0.546 
Changing plant genes, 
in food industry 
0.631 -0.201  0.182 0.616 
Diagnostics of genes, 
for family planning 
0.616 -0.188  0.134 0.525 
Diagnostics of genes, 
for decision about 
abortion 
0.616 -0.132  0.172 0.519 
Diagnostics of genes, 
for deciding about 
“test-tube” conception 
0.649 -0.137  0.181 0.584 
Therapeutic use, body 
cells 
0.700 -0.161  0.114 0.599 
Therapeutic use, sex 
cells 
0.683 -0.213  0.205 0.622 
Use by police in finding 
criminals 
0.600 -0.161  0.060  (ns)  0.430 
 
The regression coefficients are all significant at the 0.001 level, with one exception noted in 
the table. The mean proportion of variance accounted for was 0.551.  
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Table 15. Results of regression analyses of moral acceptability of the ten applications of 
gene technology, data from the experts. 
  Standardized regression coefficients 




Changing animal genes, 
in pharmaceutics indus-
try 
0.289* -0.301*  0.279*  0.273 
Changing plant genes, in 
pharmaceutics industry 
0.612*** -0.128  0.164  0.442 
Changing animal genes, 
in food industry 
0.691*** -0.178*  0.210  0.656 
Changing plant genes, in 
food industry 
0.832*** -0.050  0.105  0.767 
Diagnostics of genes, for 
family planning 
0.819*** -0.025  0.101  0.759 
Diagnostics of genes, for 
decision about abortion 
0.711*** -0.140  0.153  0.688 
Diagnostics of genes, for 
deciding about “test-
tube” conception 
0.737*** -0.092  0.194*  0.735 
Therapeutic use, body 
cells 
0.878*** -0.005  0.068  0.850 
Therapeutic use, sex cells  0.607*** -0.218  0.062  0.502 
Use by police in finding 
criminals 
0.822*** 0.091  0.028  0.619 
*** p<0.0005, *p<0.05 
 
The mean share of variance accounted for in the expert group was somewhat higher than for 
the public, 0.629. It is interesting to note that the moral judgments by the experts were (a) 
easier to account for than those by the public, and (b) less affected by risk aspects, and more 
one-dimensional in the sense that utility was strongly dominating their morality judgments. 
The same tendency was found for members of the public but it was less pronounced and risk 




Both personal and general risk of GMF was rated in a context of 45 other hazards. The public 
rated the personal GMF risk as no. 12 (M=3.34). Experts rated the GMF personal risk as no. 
45 (M=1.15.) The public rated the general GMF risk as no. 21 (M=3.46), while the experts 
rated it as smallest of all 46 risks (M=1.17).  
 
Distributions of personal and general risk ratings of genetically modified food are given in 
Fig. 4.  
 
  26Fig. 4. Personal and general risk 


































The two distributions are quite similar, suggesting that this is a risk beyond one’s control and 
hard to protect oneself from. In connection with uncertainty of risk assessments, the perceived 
lack of control could be a cause of alarm and seeing the risk as severe [63] . It can be con-
cluded that the personal risk was more salient than the general one, relatively speaking. The 
response distributions of experts and the public are compared in Figs. 5 and 6. They are strik-
ingly different in both cases, and the differences were highly significant according to chi-
square tests.  
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We wish to stress the “non-finding” above – no clear difference between personal and general 
risk. Large positive differences are often observed between general and personal risk. The 
same was true in the present study, for a large number of hazards, see Fig. 7. These hazards 
were of the same type as in many previous studies, not related to gene technology.  
 






























The risk of GMF food was rated on 19 risk dimensions, on scales from 1 to 7. The results 
were as shown in Table 16. It is clear that the risk of GMF technology was rated highly in 
most respects. The risk was new, counter to Nature, unfair and immoral. Interestingly, the 
  28most salient risk aspect was that there could be negative effects unknown today. This is an 
aspect of the limitations of scientific knowledge [106] . 
Table 16 shows dramatically large differences between experts and the public. The members 
of the public saw much larger risk components in genetically modified food than the experts, 
and they did so in all the studied aspects. 
 
Table 16. Ratings of the 19 psychometric factors, means and standard deviations, and 
tests of differences between experts and the public.  
  Public Experts   
   Mean 
Std. devia-





9, and outcome 
of t-test 
New and unknown  5.15 1.51 4.05 1.79  0.70*** 
Order of Nature is 
disturbed  5.35 1.50 2.49 1.24  1.69*** 
Hard to understand  5.23 1.37 4.58 1.65  0.45** 
Little known even to 
scientists  4.81 1.54 3.09 1.51  1.06*** 
Involuntary exposure  5.19 1.55 4.13 1.42  0.67*** 
Hard to avoid  5.18 1.46 3.64 1.53  1.01*** 
Immediate negative 
consequences  3.97 1.52 1.89 1.14  1.30*** 
Negative effects hard 
to reverse  4.62 1.54 2.47 1.17  1.32*** 
Strongly feared, 
dreaded  4.60 1.53 3.65 1.60  0.61*** 
"Unnatural" activity  5.22 1.62 2.60 1.57  1.47*** 
Will hurt children 
and future genera-
tions 
4.61 1.68 2.02 1.08  1.44*** 
Unfair and immoral  4.77 1.75 2.31 1.30  1.33*** 
Creates great worry  5.18 1.25 4.33 1.17  0.67*** 
Human arrogance 
and hubris  4.90 1.67 2.07 1.19  1.56*** 
Disaster due to inter-
ference with nature  4.98 1.65 2.20 1.17  1.55*** 
Increasing effects 
over time  5.12 1.51 2.67 1.35  1.49*** 
Will lead to cancer  3.94 1.57 1.93 0.94  1.23*** 
An activity counter to 
Nature  5.16 1.70 2.13 1.39  1.61*** 
Can have negative 
effects unknown to-
day 
5.71 1.37 3.29 1.42  1.57*** 
*** p<0.0005, ** p<0.01 
 
                                                 
9 . Standardized to give all the variables a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. This is done in order to make 
it possible to easily get a measure of the size of the differences, which is comparable across scales and studies. A 
difference about 0.6 on a standardized scale is considered to be “very large” [11] . Note that the present differ-
ences between the public and experts in most cases are much larger than that.  
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Attitudes toward technologies 
 
In this section, 18 technologies were rated on 5 dimensions. The results for genetically modi-
fied food, as judged by members of the public, were as follows. 
 
Use less: Mean=5.46 (SD=1.44), 2
nd among the 18.  
Risk: Mean=5.65 (SD=1.63), 3
rd among the 18. 
Morally unacceptable: Mean=3.71 (SD=1.10), 1
st among the 18. 
Utility: Mean=3.28 (SD=1.84), 18
th among the 18. 
Substitutability: Mean=5.57 (SD=2.23), 1
st among the 18. 
 
For experts, the results were: 
 
Use more: Mean=2.96 (SD=1.48), 3
rd among the 18.  
Risk: Mean=1.42 (SD=2.68), 17
th among the 18. 
Morally acceptable: Mean=1.98 (SD=0.95), 4
th among the 18. 
Utility: Mean=5.30 (SD=1.63), 16
th among the 18. 
Substitutability: Mean=5.25 (SD=1.88), 1
st among the 18. 
 
These results show very clearly that for members of the public, genetic modification of food 
is a technology, which is rated in a very negative manner with low utility, high risk and as 
morally little acceptable. The experts had a more complex view. They thought that GMF 
should be used more, yet that it was not irreplaceable. They found its risk to be low, and that 
it was morally acceptable, yet relatively speaking low in utility. However, the latter impres-
sion may be somewhat misleading since they rated all technologies as very useful. It is possi-
ble that their assessments were partly due to the fact that GMF is still a new technology and 
has yet to be put to large-scale use in Sweden.  
 
 
Attitude statements regarding GMF 
 
 
Responses to the 55 statements reveal much the same picture as risk and attitude ratings al-
ready described. In order to get a more comprehensive picture of the attitudes of the respon-
dents, the statements were factor analysed
10, using data from the public, and six factors were 
found to describe the data quite well: 
                                                 
10 . Factor analysis can be used to group the items in homogenous groups, on the basis of their intercorrelations. 
In this way, a more comprehensive picture of the results is provided. At the same time, more reliable measures of 
the attitudes are provided by indices, which simply are based on the average response to all items in a group. The 
homogeneity of each group can be measured by the alpha index (also called Cronbach’s alpha), which has a 
maximum value of 1.0 when all statements in a group correlate perfectly. Values above 0.7 are considered to be 
acceptable. Lower values mean that statements in the group tend to measure different dimensions and results are 
then unreliable.  
  30   Gene technology acceptance 
-  Gene technology rejection 
-  Social trust 
-  Trust in science 
-  Consumer intentions 
-  Policy acceptance 
 
Data are reported here for the groups of items, public data, beginning with the factor of gene 
technology rejection, see Table 17. Note that the items of this table and the following ones 
have been used to form a number of more precise scales, measuring various aspects used in 
regression analyses reported below.  
 
Table 17. Response distributions to items in the factor of gene technology rejection, percent 
of the respondents. Data from the public.  










Genetically modified food (GMF) only increases 
industry profit and is of no value to mankind at 
large (b) 
21.9 32.7  26.9  14.6 4.0 
Politicians should be more cautious about GMF 
(a)  45.2 29.7  15.4 6.2 3.5 
GMF is an example of human illusions about 
what is possible and appropriate  25.9 30.8  30.1 8.6 4.6 
GMF can be dangerous to people (d)  31.0 29.9  26.8 9.9 2.4 
I would not vote for a party which wanted to 
permit the use of GMF in Sweden (a)  29.3 16.2  29.5  15.3 9.5 
The supporters of GMF are naïve and gullible  10.4 16.2  42.5  23.5 7.5 
People do not have the right to change genes of 
animals and plants for economic reasons (c)  46.0 22.3  15.3  11.5 4.9 
The use of GMF should not be permitted (a)  23.7 15.7  34.4  16.2  10.0 
Authorities cannot control sufficiently carefully 
what researchers and GMF industry are up to 
(a) 
35.0 36.8  18.6 6.9 2.7 
We are not protected sufficiently against impor-
tation of GMF in Sweden (a) 
30.0 29.8  30.5 6.5 3.1 
The cultivation of GMF crops would damage the 
environment 
14.6 22.9  45.1  14.3 3.1 
If researchers and experts are uncertain about 
the risks of GMF they must let the public know 
66.7 23.8  6.2 2.0 1.3 
Gene modification is morally unacceptable (c)  16.4 22.4  33.9  20.0 7.4 
Notes. (a) Item used in forming the policy index. 
     (b) Item used in forming the benefits index 
     (c) Acceptance index item 
     (d) Risk item 
 
These items all give the same picture, one of GMF rejection. On the average, only 16.8 per-
cent of the respondents rejected statements negative to GMF. The two policy items gave rise 
to somewhat less pronounced rejection. 
 
Table 18 summarizes responses to the GMF acceptance factor items.  
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Table 18. Response distributions to items in the factor of gene technology acceptance, per-
cent of the respondents. Data from the public. 










I trust that GMF is a technology which can be 
well controlled by current regulations 
4.0 16.7  29.3  24.7  24.9 
It would be irresponsible not to develop and use 
GMF (c) 
4.6 15.7  32.2  22.3  24.9 
Those who are against GMF are ignorant reac-
tionaries 
4.6 8.1  30.4  22.0  34.6 
Talk about risks of GMF are indeed rather ri-
diculous (d) 
4.2 4.0  16.1  27.8  47.8 
The risks of GMF should not be exaggerated (d)  9.1 24.7  24.4  20.2  21.3 
GMF is a great step forward we should be grate-
ful to (b) 
4.6 17.2  34.9  20.5  22.5 
It is morally right to exploit the possibility of 
GMF (c) 
4.4 16.6  31.5  22.4  24.8 
GMF is a technology which makes it possible to 
produce food to starving people (b) 
10.2 24.7  36.3  14.7  13.8 
GMF creates a higher quality of life  3.1 12.0  33.3  23.1  28.4 
We should trust the experts, if they say GMF is 
safe then I believe it (e) 
1.8 7.5  23.9  26.1  40.5 
Corporations producing GMF are aware of their 
responsibility (e) 
2.2 10.5  35.7  28.1  23.2 
Opponents to GMF are emotional and irrational  2.4 9.6  31.8  28.1  27.8 
On the whole, society profits from GMF (b)  4.2 17.7  39.2  19.3  19.3 
Notes.  
(b) Item used in forming the benefits index 
(c) Acceptance index item 
(d) Risk item 
(e) Included in Social Trust 2 
 
 
On the average, 18.8 percent of the respondents agreed to positively worded statements re-
garding GMF, very close to the corresponding percentage that rejected negatively worded 
statements.  It is interesting to note that only 9.3 percent agreed that we should trust the ex-
perts and believe that GMF is safe if they say so.  
 
A large group, about 30 percent, was doubtful about both the positive and negative items. 
Three statements measured social trust, see Table 19.  
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Table 19. Response distributions to items in the social trust factor, percent of the respon-
dents. Data from the public. 










I trust that authorities protect us against the 
risks of GMF 
4.1 17.8  30.0  25.5  22.3 
Membership in the EU gives us good support to 
exert control over GMF in Sweden 
2.0 7.8  35.9  23.2  30.8 
GMF builds upon technology which on the whole 
gives the same results as e.g. traditional plant 
breeding 
1.8 12.4  50.1  18.5  16.9 
 
 
The statements of Table 20 measures trust in Science.  
 
Table 20. Response distributions to items in trust in science factor, percent of the respon-
dents. Data from the public. 










GMF can very well turn out to have effects un-
known today 
48.1 32.1  13.8 4.2 1.8 
Scientific knowledge about GMF is probably still 
incomplete 
44.1 32.3  17.6 4.0 2.0 
Researchers behind GMF technology are hardly 
aware of all consequences of what they create 
34.4 31.6  22.0 9.1 2.9 
We do not know yet of all the possible long-term 
effects of GMF 
52.3 31.1  8.9 4.5 3.1 
There could be negative side-effects of GMF 
unknown today 
53.9 28.5  14.0 1.8 1.8 
 
Table 21 summarizes answers to the consumer intention statements.  
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Table 21. Response distributions to items in the consumer intention factor, percent of the 
respondents. Data from the public. 










If GMF has better quality (e.g. taste, keeping 
quality) than usual food I would be quite willing 
to buy it, for the same price 
4.8 14.0  30.2  15.3  35.2 
Whenever possible I avoid buying GMF*  45.2 29.7  15.4 6.2 3.5 
I have nothing against eating GMF  5.5 12.7  21.8  15.2  44.6 
If GMF were to be about 20 percent cheaper 
than usual food, I would not hesitate to buy it.  
4.2 12.7  24.4  22.2  36.2 
I would buy GMF if it contained less fat than 
usual food 
2.2 10.9  22.0  24.5  40.1 
I would buy GMF if it was produced in a more 
environmentally friendly way than usual food 
5.8 16.7  28.6  21.9  26.8 
I would buy GMF if it was produced in a way 
more friendly to animals than usual food 
7.8 18.7  27.2  19.8  26.3 
I would buy GMF if it contained less pesticide 
residues than usual food 
10.2 20.0  29.2  16.9  23.6 
I would buy GMF if it tasted better than usual 
food 
6.9 17.4  26.0  16.1  33.6 
Note. * Reversed scoring. 
 
Facts 
Distributions of answers to six fact questions are given in Table 22.  
 
Table 22. Distributions of answers to fact questions, percent. Data from the pub-
lic. 









Ordinary tomatoes do not contain genes, but 
genetically modified tomatoes do. 
27.3 72.7 29.6 45.1 
Eating genetically modified fruit can affect the 
genes of a person. 
32.2 67.8 34.7 42.8 
It is only the genes of the mother, which decide 
if a child will be a girl. 
11.8 88.2 15.1 31.1 
Genetically modified animals are always larger 
than non-genetically modified animals. 
25.2 74.8 27.9 45.1 
More than half of human genes are identical 
with those of a chimpanzee. 
76.2  23.8 27.7 27.2 
It is impossible to transfer animal’s genes to 
plants. 
43.5 56.5 46.9    58.9 
 
A large minority apparently had confused views as to some basic facts. Compared to the 
Eurobarometer data, the present group still had better knowledge, even if the results were 
similar in 3 of the 6 questions. Part of the reason may be that the Eurobarometer study used an 
explicit DK category in this case, while the present study did not. (DK answers were scored as 
incorrect).  
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Trust 
 
Distributions of ratings of social trust are given in Table 23. These items were trust ratings, to 
be distinguished from the Likert type social trust items of Table 19.  
 
 
Table 23. Social trust ratings, percent. 









Public 17.0  29.7 37.8  13.8  1.7  EU authorities 
Experts 10.4  4.2  31.3  41.7  12.5 
            
Public 3.1  11.3  23.3 52.1  10.2  National Food Admini-
stration  Experts 6.3 2.1 10.4  60.4  20.8 
            
Public 7.5  14.3  36.2 36.0  6.1   National Board of Health 
and Welfare  Experts 8,7  13.0 23.9  47.8  6.5 
            
Public 3.5  9.9  25.0 52.6  9.0  National Institute of Pub-
lic Health  Experts 13.0  2.2  28.3  54.3  2.2 
            
Public 3.1  5.0  24.8 50.9  16.2  Researchers and experts 
at Swedish universities  Experts 4.2 2.1  4.2  60.4  29.2 
            
Public 12.6  24.2 41.8  19.0  2.4  Food processing industry 
Experts 6.3 4.2 43.8  43.8  2.1 
            
Public 3.9  12.7  33.4 43.0  7.0  Physicians 
Experts 4.2  16.7 27.1  52.1  0.0 
            
Public 16.0  27.6 42.8  12.5  1.1  The Government 
Experts 10.4 29.2  31.3  29.2  0.0 
 
The trust ratings varied a lot depending on who was the trustee. Among the group from the 
public, there was low trust in national and European politicians and the institutions of the EU, 
little trust in industry but high trust in Swedish authorities and experts. The experts showed 
high trust except for the National Institute of Public Health and they had some hesitation with 




In this section, a number of regression analyses are reported, beginning with attitudes to gene 
technology in general. Then follow analyses of several applications of gene technology as 
well as attitudes to GMF. 
 
Gene technology in general 
 
There were two attitude questions, one concerning gene modification and the other pertaining 
to diagnostics. These two attitudes were related to a number of possible explanatory variables, 
see Table 24.  
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Table 24.  Models of two global attitude ratings, standardized regression weights.  
Explanatory variable  Gene modification  Gene diagnostics 
  Public Experts  Public Experts 
Self rated knowledge   0.021  0.153  0.023  0.218 
Worry  -0.067 -0.161 -0.082 0.076 
Social utility  0.205*** 0.529*** 0.374*** 0.301* 
Risk  0.029 0.312 0.078 0.003 
Moral acceptability  0.360*** -0.141  0.268*** 0.147 
Fear  -0.207*** -0.138  -0.139*  -0.114 
Swedish legislation    0.024  0.102  -0.003  0.335 
Swedish authorities    0.022  -0.041  0.046  -0.294 
EU authorities    0.001  -0.032  -0.046  0.005 
Explained variance    0.485  0.284  0.402  0.105 
* p<0.05  *** p<0.001 
 
For the public, the results are quite similar. In both cases, a high degree of explanatory power 
was achieved, between 40 and 50 percent. In both cases, only three explanatory constructs 
contributed in a significant manner: social utility, moral acceptability and (negatively) fear.  
 
The analysis for the data from the experts should be treated with some caution since the group 
was small in relation to the number of explanatory variables. It may be noted, however, that 
utility came out as important also in the group of experts. Correlations were low for the ex-
perts, except for utility. The two dependent variables correlated equally, and strongly, for ex-
perts and the public, however, at the 0.5 level. The results suggest that experts were mostly 
considering utility in their judgments of gene technology at the over-all level.  
 
Specific applications of gene technology 
 
Each of ten specific applications was rated as to over-all attitude and in four aspects, viz. 
moral acceptability, utility, risk and acceptable risk. The results are given in Table 25 for the 
public sample. 
 
 The results are quite similar with one exception, forensic use. A very high level of explana-
tory power was achieved, mainly on the basis of moral acceptability and social utility. Risk 
variables played an unexpected subordinate role in the models. It was also true that moral 
acceptability appeared to be the most important factor, except in the forensic application case, 
where utility was clearly more important. Note, however, that these statements are based on 
regression weights, which in turn reflect, among other things, intercorrelations of the explana-
tory variables. The raw correlations between risk and attitudes to gene technology were siz-
able, and statistically highly significant.  
 
For the experts, the results were quite similar. Utility and moral acceptability dominated as 
explanatory variables. The level of explained variance achieved with experts was even higher 
than with the sample from the public.  
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Table 25.  Models of attitudes to 10 specific applications of gene technology, standard-
ized regression weights. Public sample.  



















0.534*** 0.378***  -0.054*  0.048*  0.799 
Family plan-
ning 
0.463*** 0.447***  0.032  0.068*  0.724 
Abortion  0.393*** 0.507***  -0.012  0.047 0.726 
“Test-tube” 
conception 
0.500*** 0.447***  0.003 0.014 0.787 
Therapeutic 
use, body cells 
0.479*** 0.457***  -0.039  -0.001 0.778 
Therapeutic 
use, sex cells 
0.561*** 0.380***  -0.042  0.017 0.801 
Forensic use  0.165*** 0.585***  -0.096**  0.058 0.539 
 
 
The Extended Psychometric Model 
 
The traditional Psychometric Models reduced the number of crucial risk factors to two over-
arching factors: Dread and New Risk. The present design made it possible to measure three 
more factors: Interfering with Nature, Immoral Risk and Severity of Consequences. Thus, five 
factors were estimated in the form of indices; see Table 26 for their properties. Note that 
Dread is measured by emotion items only. 
 
Table 26. Properties of five factors of the Extended Psychometric Model, public sample. 
Factor  Coefficient alpha  Number of items 
Dread  0.76 2 
New Risk  0.84 4 
Interfering with Nature  0.91 4 
Immoral risk  0.90 6 
Severity of consequences  0.81 3 
 
The five factors were used as explanatory variables in models of the perceived risk. The re-
sults are given in Table 27.  
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Table 27.  Models of risk perception, standardized regression weights, public sample. 
Explanatory variable  Personal risk  General risk 
Dread  -0.038 0.016 
New Risk  -0.025 -0.078 
Interfering with Nature  0.095 0.174* 
Immoral risk  0.256** 0.292*** 
Severity of consequences  0.233** 0.176* 
Explained variance  0.247 0.305 
 
A fair level of explained variance was achieved, especially for general risk. It is interesting 
that the traditional factors of the Psychometric Model had no explanatory power when the 
new factors were added
11. In particular, the factor Immoral Risk was an important explana-
tory variable.  
 
Early in the history of risk perception and psychometric model research, it was asserted that 
experts make risk judgments on the basis of objective facts, while members of the public are 
affected by the various subjective factors of the model [24; 129] . This assertion has only re-
cently been challenged [75; 107] . To my knowledge, the present study is the first one where 
it can be checked on data from gene technology experts. Table 28 shows correlations between 




Table 28.  Correlations between risk perception ratings and the psychometric factors for the public 
and experts.   
  Personal risk  General risk 
Explanatory vari-
able  Public Experts  Public Experts 
Dread  0.40 0.43 0.19 0.01 
New Risk  0.44 0.51 0.31  -0.06 
Interfering with 
Nature  0.47 0.53 0.47 0.08 
Immoral risk  0.51 0.56 0.61 0.38 
Severity of conse-
quences  0.50 0.54 0.47 0.08 
Epistemological 
trust  0.24 -0.31 -0.27 -0.08 
Social trust 
(Likert items)  -0.38 -0.42 -0.52 -0.30 
 
For personal risk, the correlations were similar for experts and the public. For general risk, 
experts gave lower correlations, especially for the two traditional psychometric factors of 
New Risk and Dread. It is interesting to note that the low correlations between perceived risk 
and psychometric factors are found for (a) general risk, and (b) the two traditional basic psy-
chometric dimensions. When personal risk and/or a broader sample of dimensions are studied, 
the picture is different. Experts no longer appear to be unaffected by “subjective” factors.  
 
                                                 
11 . Note, however, that the Dread factor as defined here is purely emotional. In most previous work on the Psy-
chometric Model, severity of consequences has been combined with a single emotion item, which has given its 
name to the mixture. 
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As already pointed out above, ratings of GMF technology were, relatively speaking, quite 
low. It was still of some interest to relate policy attitude regarding GMF (should it be used 
more or less) to the four other technology dimensions. A regression model fitted well, ex-
plained variance was 0.616. Standardized regression weights for risk, moral value, utility and 
substitutability were 0.244, 0.362, 0.293 and 0.019, respectively. All were statistically signifi-
cant with the exception of the last value. Once more, the moral dimension appears to be 
dominating the picture, but it should be noted that risk also has a sizable regression weight.  
 
For the experts, a similar analysis resulted in a somewhat less powerful model, explained 
variance 0.449, with risk as the only significant explanatory variable.  
 
Acceptance/rejection, consumer intentions and policy attitudes 
 
The present section reports the results on the attitude questions regarding GMF, data from the 
public sample. The analyses are used to construct psychometrically sound indices of various 
factors found in the set of attitude items. Data from the public and the experts are compared 
on these indices, since a detailed comparison at the item level would be hard to get an over-
view of. The reader who wants to check out the results at the item level is referred to the Ap-
pendix.  
 
To measure attitude towards GMF, the attitude ratings of gene technology for food produc-
tion, plants and animals, were combined (two items)
12. Two more dependent variables were 
of interest, viz. Consumer Intention with regard to GMF, and Policy Acceptance. Items meas-
uring Consumer Intention expressed a will to buy and consume GMF, while policy items were 
about voting or not voting for a GMF friendly party, to take an example.  
 
The explanatory variables were the five factors of the Extended Psychometric Model, Trust in 
GMF Science, Social Trust in GMF experts and regulators, Neophobia, New Age beliefs and 
Suspiciousness. Social trust was measured both on the basis of the ratings of trust (Social 
Trust 1) and on the basis of items in the list of Likert type attitude items (Social Trust 2)
13. 
Psychometric properties of these indices are given in Table 28. See Table 26 for correspond-
ing information about the factors of the Extended Psychometric Model. 
                                                 
12 . Note that these items belong to an earlier part of the questionnaire and not to the list of Likert attitude items.  
13 The reason for using both types of measures was that previous work, see introduction, had suggested that the 
response format was important and affected the predictive properties of the trust measures.  
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Table 28.  Properties of dependent and explanatory variables.  
Variable  Coefficient alpha  Number of items 
Overall Attitude  0.80 2 
Acceptance of GMF policy  0.78 5 
Acceptance of GMF  0.81 4 
Consumer Intention  0.95 9 
Trust in GMF Science  0.80 5 
Social Trust 1  0.88 8 
Social Trust 2  0.81 5 
Neophobia  0.75 3 
New Age beliefs  0.88 9 
Suspiciousness  0.82 13 
Risk level  0.66 3 
Benefit of GMF  0.87 4 
 
Results of regression analyses are given in Table 29. 
 
Table 29.  Regression models of attitudes to genetically modified food (GMF), 
standardized weights.  






New risk  -0.028 0.113*  -0.067 
Dread  -0.005 0.084    -0.001 
Severity of Consequences    0.140  0.047   0.057  
Morally unacceptable risk  -0.140    -0.308***   0.011 
Interfering with Nature  -0.176*     0.058  -0.164** 
Trust in Science  -0.016     0.379***  0.043    
Social Trust 1 (trust ratings)   0.053  0.101**  -0.024 
Social Trust 2 (Likert items)  -0.004      0.006   0.205*** 
Neophobia  -0.021     -0.118***  -0.036 
New Age beliefs  -0.005 -0.032   0.011 
General Suspiciousness  0.089*   -0.056  0.099** 
Benefit  0.413*** 0.303*** 0.439*** 
Over-all risk level  -0.122* -0.174***  -0.196*** 
Explained variance  0.437 0.685 0.738 
Explained variance using only back-
ground data (sex, age educational 
level) 
0.109 0.043 0.044 
 
 
The results show the following: 
 
-  All three models reached a very high level of explanatory power 
 
-  The traditional Psychometric Model factors contributed virtually 
no explanatory power 
 
-  Moral acceptability and Interfering with Nature were the most 
important factors of the Extended Psychometric Model 
 
-  Benefit was a very important explanatory construct. 
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-  Both Trust in Science and Social Trust were important, Trust in 
Science clearly more than Social Trust. Social trust based on the 
Likert items was possibly more powerful as an explanatory con-
cept than trust based on trust ratings 
 
-  Comparing the different independent variables, moral value and 
trust in Science were of particular importance for policy. Bene-
fit, risk, Interfering with Nature and Social Trust were most im-
portant for consumer intention. For Overall Attitude, benefit, in-
terference with Nature, and risk were the most important factors.  
 
-  Other variables, resembling personality factors, contributed little 
or nothing to the models, except that Neophobia made a small 
contribution, in one case and Suspiciousness in two others. 
 
-  Demographics accounted for less than 5 percent of the variance 
of the dependent variables, except for Overall Attitude 
 
 
The role of risk perception is well covered in these models, but it might be of interest also to 
include global risk ratings, personal and general. When this was done, it was found that gen-
eral risk contributed somewhat to policy attitude, personal risk to general acceptance of GMF. 
These results were interesting both for documenting the importance of perceived risk and for 
confirming earlier work where general risk, in particular, had policy implications for certain 
hazards [112] . 
 
Previous work on data collected in Sweden has led to the unexpected conclusion that per-
ceived risk has no importance at all for GMF attitude (acceptance) [26] . This finding gets no 
support in the present context. In order to delineate, in a clear manner, the roles of risk and 
benefit, models were estimated for the three attitude dimensions with level of perceived risk 
and benefit as the only explanatory variables. See Table 30. 
 
 
Table 30.  Regression models using only risk and benefit as explanatory variables, 
standardized weights.  




Benefit  0.494*** 0.454*** 0.568*** 
Risk level  -0.209*** -0.340*** -0.345** 
Explained variance  0.422 0.512 0.685 
 
 
This supplementary analysis shows that even very simple models can reach a high level of 
explained variance. More important, it shows that risk makes a very significant contribution, 
not only benefit. 
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All differences between experts and the public were statistically significant. Most of them 
were dramatically large. More specifically, experts as compared to the public, were 
 
-  More likely to feel that GMF is beneficial (1.08)
14 
 
-  More likely to be in general accepting of GMF (1.62) 
 
-  More likely to accept GMF as a policy issue (1.53) 
 
-  More likely to trust scientific knowledge regarding GMF (1.21) 
 
-  Less likely to see GMF as posing a new risk (1.21) 
 
-  Less likely to regard the GMF risk as something dreaded (1.02) 
 
-  Less likely to see GMF as something interfering with Nature 
(1.73) 
 
-  Less likely to see GMF as morally unacceptable (1.49) 
 
-  Less likely to feel that GMF has risks with very severe possible 
consequences (1.56) 
 
-  More likely to trust experts and organizations (0.39 and 0.96) 
 
-  More likely to be willing consumers of GMF (1.22) 
 




These differences between the two groups could not be accounted for by differences in gender 
and age. 
                                                 
14 . The numbers give differences in standardized scores.  
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Political preference, interest, technological pessimism and atti-
tudes to GMF 
 
The respondents in the public sample indicated which of 7 parties (+ “other”) they would cur-
rently vote for. Mean standardized values
15 in acceptance, policy attitude and consumer inten-
tion were computed for each party group, see Table 31. The differences were highly statisti-
cally significant. The F values were, for policy attitude, acceptance and consumer intention, 
respectively: 5.627 (7,389) p<0.0005, 4.682 (7,388) p<0.0005 and 4.700 (7,391) p<0.0005. 
These low p values are of course largely a function of the large sample size. It is more inter-
esting to look at the span of standardized means in Table 31, which depicts a very dramatic 
variation between the extremes. At one end, we find supporters of the Liberals and Conserva-
tives who were positive (relatively speaking) to GMF, at the other extreme the supporters of 
the Environmentalist Party who were very negative. The large social democratic block occu-
pied a position in the middle of the range.  
 
Table 31. Mean standardized values in three variables for supporters of the seven domi-
nating parties in Swedish national politics.  
Party  Policy attitude  Acceptance of GMF  Consumer intention 
Environmentalists  -0.58 -0.57  -0.63 
Center Party  -0.40 -0.17  -0.24 
Left Party (communists)              -0.18  -0.22  -0.23 
Christian Democrats  -0.17 -0.07  0.06 
Social Democrats  0.05 0.03  -0.01 
Conservatives  0.45 0.36  0.36 
Liberals  0.37 0.52  0.45 
 
 
It is important to stress that the political dimension correlated so strongly with attitudes across 
parties only partly coincided with the traditional left-right dimension. The Center Party, for 
example, is considered to be “non-socialist” in Swedish politics, and the Christian Democrats 
are decidedly so. Yet, the Social Democrats came out as more positive to gene technology 
than these two non-socialist parties. The Environmentalists often support socialist policies, 
but not always, and they are not adherents of traditional socialist thinking. The dimension of 
Table 31 can be best thought of as a dimension reflecting the attitude to economic growth and 
technology. This sort of variability of opinion is commonly found in other conflicts over tech-
nology, such as the siting of a nuclear waste repository [125] .  
 
It may also be noted, in this section, that an analysis was done to define “the engaged public”, 
in the manner of thinking used in the latest Eurobarometer report on biotechnology [37] . 
There were 3 questions measuring interest in gene technology, its risks and benefits. How-
ever, relations to attitudes were very weak (see Table 32), as they seem to have been also in 
the Eurobarometer study. The political dimension was a much more powerful explanatory 
variable.  
 
Another notion mentioned in the literature is that of technological pessimism [140] . One 
                                                 
15 . Standardized to give all the variables a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. This is done in order to make 
it possible to easily get a measure of the size of the differences, which is comparable across scales and studies. A 
difference about 0.6 on a standardized scale is considered to be “very large” [11] . Note that the present span 
from Liberals to Environmentalists is much larger than that.  
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correlated with the three attitude dimensions, see Table 32. The general pessimism factor had 
some promise in accounting for GMF attitudes, while interest did not. Siegrist found similar 
results with a scale measuring the value of Nature [85] . 
 
Table 32. Correlations between attitudes to GMF, interest and technology pessimism.  
Attitude dimension  Interest Pessimism 
Policy attitude  0.053 0.171*** 
Acceptance of GMF  -0.051 0.274*** 









The present response rate was somewhat lower than in several previous studies with equally 
long questionnaires. We have noted a tendency towards lower response rates over a 20-year 
period. One reason may be that the percentage of immigrants is steadily rising in the popula-
tion, now about 15 percent. Linguistic problems may make it hard and unattractive for them to 
respond to long questionnaires.  
 
In the present sample, 12.2 percent had names of non-Swedish origin. The response rate in 
that sub-sample was 30.3 percent, as compared to 48.9 percent in the rest of the sample. Since 
some people with a non-Swedish name are born in the country and speak perfect Swedish
16, 
the response rate of 30.3 percent is probably an overestimate of the likelihood that immigrants 
will take part in a study of the present type. The factor of increased immigration can be ex-
pected, hence, to decrease over-all response rate at least by 2-3 percent but other factors 
probably have the main responsibility of the drop from about 60 percent response rate in pre-
vious work. The length of the questionnaire is hardly a likely explanation since previous work 
also used long questionnaires and international research on that question suggests that the 
length of the questionnaire is not a major determinant of response rate [46] . Mailed surveys 
usually give a somewhat lower response rate than face-to-face interviews [41] , but the differ-
ence seems to be decreasing [47] .  The cost of face-to-face interviews, per question, is usu-
ally prohibitive when a very large number of questions are needed to map the pertinent beliefs 
and attitudes, as in the present study.  
 
In spite of the response rate problem, the present data showed that the respondents probably 
could be considered an approximately representative sample of the population with regard to 
important background data, with the exception of level of education. Demographic data ac-
counted for only about 5 percent of the variance of important dependent variables. Analysis of 
the data also showed that the level of education was only weakly correlated with important 
response variables so there is reason to be optimistic also with regard to this factor. If any bias 
is present in the data, it probably means that the attitudes of the respondents are somewhat 
more positive than they are in the population as a whole.  
                                                 
16 . Yet, there was a strong correlation between origin of name and self-rated knowledge of Swedish.  
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Some more information on representativeness can be obtained by comparing the results with 
Eurobarometer 58.0. Several qualifications must be mentioned, however.  
 
•  The Eurobarometer data were obtained in 2002, the present data one year 
later. This need not be an important factor, however.  
•  The Eurobarometer data were collected in in-home interviews, which 
probably means that a tendency towards social desirability response bias 
was present, in this context possibly producing a more positive attitude 
towards GMF and other biotechnology. 
•  It is well known that mailed surveys where a “doubtful” or “don’t know” 
(DK) alternative is available will elicit more such responses than face-to-
face interviews
17. Interviewers are often instructed to cajole hesitant re-
spondents into taking a stand. This is especially true with matters of high 
technical difficulty.  
•  A related issue emerges with regard to knowledge questions. In the pre-
sent study, only two alternatives were presented and people were en-
couraged to choose “True” or “False”. Only about 4 percent abstained 
from answering and were not counted as incorrect. In the Eurobarometer 
study, DK was a permitted alternative and was counted as incorrect. This 
may explain some of the differences between the two studies in this re-
spect.  
•  The present data were collected with a response rate just below 50 per-
cent. Inquiries about the Eurobarometer study failed to provide any in-
formation about their response rate in Swedish data.  
 
In spite of these caveats, a comparison is of interest in 4 cases, where the same attitude state-
ments were used in both studies, see Table 33. The present DK data are based on selections of 
the mid response alternative “doubtful”, a practice with some research support [70] .  
 
Table  33. Comparison of present and Eurobarometer 58.0 data on 4 attitude 
statements, percent. 
Statement  Percent “agree”  Percent “Don’t know’ 




Present data  Eurobarometer 
data 
I would buy GMF if it con-
tained less fat than usual food. 
12.6 22.0  21.1  5.6 
I would buy GMF if it were 
produced in a more environ-
mentally friendly way than 
usual food. 
21.5 42.0  27.3  11.6 
I would buy GMF if it con-
tained less pesticide residues 
than usual food. 
29.0 45.0  27.9  12.3 
I would buy GMF if it tasted 
better than usual food. 
23.2 32.0  24.7  8.9 
 
                                                 
17 . When an explicit DK alternative is used, there will usually be a much larger number of respondents who 
choose it, as compared to the number who simply skip a question [80; 81] . 
  45The expected difference with regard to DK answers occurred, and was large
18. If the DK’s 
can be divided evenly between Agree and Don’t Agree, we observe a good agreement be-
tween present data and the Eurobarometer data in two cases, somewhat worse in two others. 
The two items with sizeable percent agreement with the Eurobarometer study were both con-
cerned with generally embraced values such as being against pesticides and for the environ-
ment. It is possible that a social desirability bias was at play in the in-home interviews, as it 
often is. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the present data give a truer picture of the pub-
lic’s opinion.  
 
About 35 percent of the respondents in the present study answered, to the question about their 
knowledge of these topics, that it was very small or non-existent. The Eurobarometer data 
show – see Table 33 – that only about 10 percent said they did not know enough to answer the 
questions singled out here for comparative purposes. The DK proportion was about 25 percent 
in the present data, in much better agreement with self-rated knowledge. It is therefore very 
likely that the interviewers in the Eurobarometer study exerted some more or less subtle pres-
sure on the respondents to take a stand. It is quite noteworthy that the data presented by the 
Eurobarometer report on acceptance of various statements may contain about 50 percent con-
sisting of respondents who really felt that they did not know how to answer the questions. 
Such responses may of course still contain some information, but it is debatable how much 
value it has [53; 84] .  At any rate, this issue needs more critical analysis and discussion.  
 
It is particularly interesting that the present group was more knowledgeable than the Euro-
barometer sample on 4 of the 6 fact questions, see Table 22. This may be the result of stronger 
self-selection among those who answered to the mailed questionnaire. They were probably 
more interested and hence were likely to have better knowledge. Persons that are more inter-
ested are found among so-called stakeholders, and they are more likely to take part in a survey 
with a societal interest [42] . At the same time, stakeholders tend to deviate from the popula-




There are a number of approaches to defining expertise [83] . One extreme type of definition 
would be to sample world famous researchers in the field or Nobel Laureates. It would obvi-
ously be difficult to obtain a sizable sample in that way. In addition, there is no support, as far 
as I know, for an assumption that leading researchers have different risk perceptions and atti-
tudes as compared to well qualified academics in general in the field in question. 
 
Although it can be seen as somewhat doubtful if all the experts taking part in the present study 
really were true experts of gene technology, the group as a whole gives a convincing yes in 
reply to that question
19. Over-whelming majorities had a Ph. D. and were formally qualified 
at least at the level of associate professor (“docent”). Many had a large number of scientific 
publications. They had their academic basis in Natural Science or Medicine, with few excep-
tions. The fact that some of them still rated their level of expertise as fairly limited can per-
haps be attributed to modesty prescribed by cultural values; at any rate, analyses of some of 
the data in relation to self-assessed level of expertise revealed few substantial relationships.  
                                                 
18 . Very similar results were obtained in a study of nuclear waste attitudes, where it was also possible to com-
pare interviews with response to a mailed survey containing some of the same questions in both cases [116] .  
19 A study by Savadori et al. [78]  compared a group of the general population with “experts”, some of which 
were only graduate students in biology. They did not state how many members of their group were students and 
how many were professors, nor how qualified the students were.  
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The response rate among those tentatively identified as experts was 60 percent. It should be 
noted that 16 of the respondents indicated that they were not gene technology experts; their 
data has not been used in the analyses of the present report. It seems likely that 60 percent is 




The moral aspect was throughout quite important. It was a driving factor behind attitudes, or 
overall assessments, of the 10 types of gene technology studied. However, different kinds of 
gene technology were assessed in different ways as to morality. The use of gene technology in 
the food industry was judged as morally less acceptable than for medical use, and changing 
the genes of plants was more acceptable than doing the same in the case of animals. In human 
reproduction, the most “unnatural” kind of technological intervention – “test-tube babies” – 
was the least morally acceptable one. Moral judgment by itself could largely be accounted for 
by utility and risk; for experts utility was a clearly dominating factor in moral judgments. 
Medical applications were judged as more morally acceptable when applied to people living 
today than to coming generations.  
 
Three principles can be discerned behind these results on morality judgments: 
 
-  Utility. What is useful is seen as morally correct. 
 
-  Risk. What is risky is seen as morally incorrect. 
 
 
-  Naturalness. What is “normal” and “natural” is seen as morally 
correct. 
 
-  Humanness. Animals are more similar to humans than plants are; 
hence, it is morally less acceptable to modify their genes.  
 
 
-  It is less acceptable to modify genes of coming generations than 
the present one, perhaps because people living now can have 
some influence over what happens to them.  
 
These are tentative suggestions. It is, however, likely that the judgments of moral correctness 
or incorrectness are rather shallow, cp. the high degree of determination by utility in the mo-
rality judgments made by the experts. It is possible that moral choice dilemmas would bring 
out more sophisticated or at least multidimensional types of moral judgments and considera-
tions. On the other hand, such dilemmas may not be of crucial importance for social policy, 




Gene technology as a whole was rated by the public sample in a moderately positive manner, 
but people indicated that they had little knowledge about it. Specific applications were rated 
in very diverse ways. Medical and forensic applications were well accepted while food indus-
try applications were less so, especially gene modification of animals for food purposes. Ge-
  47netic modification for food purposes was rated as the least accepted technology in a set of 18 
technologies. It was seen as the most dispensable technology, morally unacceptable and risky.  
General and personal risks of GMF were close, suggesting that the hazard associated with 
genetically modified food was one, which was hard to avoid. It is an open question if these 
attitudes can change and, for example, if monetary incentives may counteract them and make 
people more willing to consume GMF [50] .  
 
Townsend, Clarke and Travis [138]  studied attitudes and risk perception of GMF in a context 
of other grave concerns, such as nuclear war and cancer. They found that GMF was not rated 
among the top concerns, an unexpected finding according to them. However, other work and 
the results of the present study do place GMF in the bottom of the list of technologies. This 
does not imply that it is also among the very worst concerns generally. Townsend, Clarke and 
Davis did not compare GMF with a list of technologies. Yet, the finding by Townsend and 
Campbell [137]  that 93 percent of an experimental sample willingly tasted an apple which 
was said to be genetically modified is puzzling. A much smaller percentage, 48 percent, said 
they would be willing to buy GMF in the future, but that percentage is still unexpectedly high. 
It would be interesting and important to follow up on these findings and check to what extent 
they are related to expectations of what is appropriate behaviour in an experiment of this type. 
After all, the participants had been recruited to take part in an experiment which, so were they 
told, would involve the tasting of apples.  
 
The trends in attitude data from the experts were quite similar, but on a higher level through-
out. They were much more positive to GMF, saw smaller risks and found it morally much 





Data on social trust showed that Swedish experts and authorities were rather highly trusted 
with regard to genetically modified food, industry and politicians less so. There was a demand 
for a more alert policy against the dangers of GMF. Experts showed similar trends, but exhib-
ited throughout a higher level of trust. Frewer and Miles also found low trust for industry [35] 
, which they attributed to “food scares”, but low trust in industry may have deeper roots. 
Many people see industry as having a vested interest and giving priority to its own profits. 




Summing up the results of the model analyses, it was found that traditional factors used in 
many previous studies of risk perception, i. e. New Risk and Dread, had little or nothing to 
offer beyond the set of dimensions introduced here. Similarly, social trust – which is the 
dominating trust aspect studied in previous work – had a relatively weak influence as com-
pared to the factor Trust in Science, defined in our previous work with regard to policy [106] . 
The four dominating factors behind attitudes to gene technology in general, to specific appli-
cations, and to GMF, which was studied in depth, were: 
 
  -     Benefit 
-  Morally unacceptable risk 
-  Risk 
-  Lack of trust in Science 
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These factors accounted for a very large share of attitudes and risk perceptions, approaching a 
full explanation if error variance is taken into account
20. Other work with a similar orientation 
is scarce so far, but a study by Saba and Vassalo is interesting [76] . They found that con-
sumer intention was explained to 41 percent with their attitude models
21, considerably lower 
than the present results. Townsend and Campbell [137]  found, in an experimental study, that 
risk factors explained 46 percent of the variance opf consumer intention. Recently published 
Eurobarometer work reported an even lower level of explained variance [38] .   
 
In some cases, we also found associations with Social Trust, global risk ratings, New Risk and 
Dread. Emotional reactions were not found to be of importance, however, refuting the com-
mon assertion that “affect” is of major importance in risk perception [57] . This assertion is 
built upon terminological confusion, since “affect” is not used in its dominating sense in natu-
ral language (emotion) but as liking, or attitude [120] . Ideology is a more likely alternative as 
a basis for understanding risk perception and related attitudes [43; 118] . 
 
Statements about the importance of various dimensions for “acceptance” are found in the re-
port by Fjaestad et al [26] , being an analysis of Swedish Eurobarometer data, but no data 
analysis is described or otherwise reported. Among other things, they claim that risk is totally 
unimportant. This statement seems to build upon data from a single dimension of “riskiness to 
society”. As noted above, this is a matter, which needs careful consideration of what risk di-
mensions are investigated. Hunt and Frewer, among others, have found very clearly that risk 
is an important factor in attitudes to GMF, just as in the present study [48] . 
 
There is risk to society, but also personal risk and risk to people in general. These are all quite 
distinct risk aspects [16] . The traditional Psychometric Model risk factors are indeed weak as 
explanatory variables [96]  but the theme of risk is much more complex and powerful than 
that. In particular, these researchers claimed that benefit was by far the most important factor. 
In our data, we have also found that benefit dominated the picture for consumer intention, but 
for policy acceptance, it was trust in Science, which was most important. Varying angles were 
made possible by our design which included about 3 times as many questions as the Euro-
barometer design. The design we have used is built upon previous experience with new 
emerging dimensions in our risk perception research, and on a conviction that consequences 
of beliefs about hazardous technology need to be differentiated [99; 102] . Policy attitudes are 
one thing, consumer intention another, to take an example.  
 
It is interesting to note that previous work on different trust measures was confirmed. A trust 
measure based on Likert type items of trust was somewhat more powerful as an explanatory 
variable than trust ratings, when the dependent variables were other Likert type measures. 
                                                 
20 . It is likely that another 15 percent, approximately, is true variance, which could be accounted for if new 
constructs were to be introduced in the models. It is an interesting challenge to try to formulate hypotheses about 
such additional explanatory factors.  One obvious possibility is that of political values and preferences. Some 
personality factors, especially emotional instability [54] , may also be of importance.  Other work has found 
some evidence for the importance of control and self-identity [132] . The effect, if any, of the latter variable was 
very weak, however. In future work, it would be interesting to study also questions about the nature/nurture 
controversy [91] .  
 
21 . They applied the Theory of Reasoned Action and the Theory of Planned Behavior [1; 2] , which seldom give 
better results than they achieved. These are common-sense models, which are not flexible enough to incorporate 
additional factors, which may be called for in special applications.  Typical variance accounted for in food appli-
cations would seem to be 30 percent or less [3] . 
  49(This finding may be more general than that. In relation to risk ratings, the trust score based 
on ratings correlated about –0.25 while the Likert item based trust score correlated about 




The results from the groups of experts showed very clearly that there were large, often dra-
matic, differences between experts and the public. These differences occurred in both specific 
and more general measures. Experts saw gene technology as more beneficial than the public 
did, and as more morally justified and less risky. Their judgments seemed to be more gov-
erned by benefits than any other factors. For example, the public’s judgments of morality 
were driven by both risk and benefits, while the experts tended to reflect mostly benefits in 
their judgments. These results could not explained by restriction of range phenomena since 
the judgments made by the experts had enough variation to show large correlations in several 
other respects. The group of experts differed in gender and age from the distribution of the 
public sample but these factors could not explain the large differences between experts and 
the public.  
 
The often-stated conclusion from early risk perception research that experts make objective 
risk judgments not affected by the psychometric factors was not supported by the present data. 
However, the results suggest why that conclusion was suggested in the early work. Experts’ 
risk judgments were not correlated with the traditional psychometric factors of New Risk and 
Dread as far as general risk was concerned. These were the factors studied in the seminal 
work of Fischhoff et al. [25] . The present data showed that experts’ risk ratings had proper-
ties very similar to those of the public sample, when personal risk was studied, and when the 
factors of the extended psychometric model were considered, i.e. morality, interfering with 
Nature and severity of consequences. The correlations between risk judgments and trust 
scores were quite similar for experts and the public, also supporting the thesis advanced else-
where that experts and the public give risk judgments, which are qualitatively similar even if 
their levels differ [107] . There is of course a huge difference between experts and most mem-
bers of the public when it comes to knowledge, but this “knowledge gap” does not tell the 
whole story of the differences between the two groups, as argued by Hansen et al., by Frewer 
and by Dietrich and Schibeci [12; 29; 44] , and shown here.  
 
Previous work on experts and the public has shown that experts were likely to judge risks as 
smaller when with regard to hazards within their area of responsibility [123; 124] . A check 
on the present data showed that there were no significant risk judgments differences between 
experts and the public, within genders, for risks other than GMF.  
 
Risk vs. benefit 
 
Gene technology risks were studied in several perspectives in the present report. One striking 
finding was that the risk of GMF was at the same level when rated as a personal or general 
risk. Previous work on the risk of genetic engineering showed, on the contrary, a clear differ-
ence between personal and general risk [117] . That could have been caused by differences in 
wording of the risk. However, anything we consume can be seen to be under control. A prime 
example is alcohol, where people typically give low ratings of personal risk and high ratings 
of risk to others [97] . It would be interesting to study risk perception under special condi-
tions, such as explicit labelling of genetically modified food.  
 
  50The Eurobarometer work carried out in Sweden has been claimed to show that risk has no 
importance for the attitude to GMF [26; 146] . It now seems clear that this statement, impor-
tant if it were true, is incorrect. Gaskell et al. [38]  give the most recent analysis of the Euro-
barometer data, and risk does make an important contribution to the modelling attitude in their 
work The present results, see e.g. Table 21, show clearly that perceived risk does play an im-
portant role in attitudes to GMF. It is likely that the false impression produced by previous 
work in this respect is due to the paucity of appropriate measures of risk – the measurement of 
perceived risk can proceed in many ways and not all will show the true story of how risk in-
fluences attitude. It may be pointed out, in addition, that much previous work in other coun-
tries has shown that risk is important for GMF attitudes; see e.g. Rosita and Saba [73] . Risk 
is not the whole story, but it is an important part of it.  
 
It should also be noted that the Eurobarometer work, where it was claimed that risk has no or 
a very small importance, partly used self-ratings of the importance of various factors. Are 
people able and willing to give valid ratings of the weights they have given to various attrib-
utes in their assessments of the technologies? This is a highly controversial issue, and psy-
chologists have for decades argued, on good grounds, that people cannot give valid judgments 
of what influenced their behavior [66] . The issue obviously needs further research. Barlas [4]  
is perhaps the most recent contributor to the issue, and she found clear evidence that rated 
importance did not give a valid picture of real reasons for choices. People used the impor-
tance ratings to justify their choices in terms of socially desirable dimensions. It is quite pos-
sible that a dimension such as “morality” fits in well with the need to manage impressions, 
while “riskiness” may have connotations of lack of rationality and a tendency to be “subjec-
tive” and “emotional”, hence a less popular alternative as a reason for choice.  
 
Some qualifications to these conclusions are called for. First, regression analyses of the spe-
cific applications of gene technology gave very low weights for risk. This is in spite of sizable 
correlations between risk and the over-all assessment of the applications. A similar result was 
found for the global assessments of gene technology as such. Correlated explanatory variables 
sometimes result in misleading conclusions if only standardized regression coefficients are 
taken into account.  
 
Another possible explanation of these anomalous results is the choice of verbal definitions of 
the rating variables. The respondents were asked to rate to which extent a certain technology 
was “risky”
22 or even, with a more appropriate translation, “highly risky”. It would be inter-
esting to check on these items with different wordings, for example by replacing the term cor-
responding to “highly risky” with a less demanding expression.  
 
Further comparison with Eurobarometer results 
 
The pessimistic picture of public opinion painted by the Eurobarometer results may be largely 
a function of how questions were worded
23. It is true that, relatively speaking, gene technol-
ogy was sometimes rated very low in the present study, especially food industry applications. 
However, even in this case, only a minority definitely rejected the application, and in other 
cases, the share of clearly negative respondents was small. In the case of forensic use, it was 
almost zero. How could such differences arise? There are at least two important explanations. 
                                                 
22 . In Swedish ”riskfylld”. 
23 . The issue is quite complex, since the Eurobarometer work may have involved one or several factors working 
in the opposite direction as well. See the discussion above about social desirability factors at play in face-to-face 
interviews, and the practices of cajoling hesitant respondents to take a stand.  
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First, some of the Eurobarometer questions were formulated in a highly technical manner, 
using such terms as stem cells without further explanation. And an explanation would be quite 
difficult to provide, given that it must be both brief and correct. In the present study, we de-
cided to avoid the term for this very reason.  
 
Second, and more important, the Eurobarometer questions introduced, in a somewhat subtle 
manner, considerations, which seem to have guided the respondents in a negative direction. 
Take forensic applications as an example. The Eurobarometer researchers have claimed that 
there is not even a majority in Sweden in favour of forensic applications of gene technology 
[26] . That claim is based on responses to the following statement: 
 
 
“I would support that the police had access to genetic information of people
24 as a help 
in their work to solve crimes”. 
 
Compare with the present formulation: 
 
“Gene technology can be used by the police in their work to find who has committed a 
certain crime (DNA analysis). What is your opinion about police using that technol-
ogy?“ 
 
Note that the Eurobarometer formulation suggests that use of a large “gene bank” which the 
police would have regular access to. This is very different from using genetic information in 
investigating single persons and a specific crime. The gene bank scenario is hardly a realistic 




Gene technology gave rise to very varied reactions, depending on field of application. Medi-
cal applications were quite acceptable, a forensic application even more so. Genetically modi-
fied food ranked very low in trust and popularity, in spite of very few having had personal 
negative experiences of it.  
 
Different demographic strata had similar views. Personality factors were probably of little 
importance as well. Moral issues played a very big role. In addition, trust, or lack of trust, in 
Science per se was of great importance, and so was perceived benefit. Gene technology is, 
thus, by no means rejected by the public as a whole. These results are in good agreement with 
previous work of ours, based on extensive population samples and re-analyzed for the purpose 
of the present project [117] .  
 
In the present study, experts were much more positive than members of the public to gene 
technology including GMF, in almost all respects. This was so in spite of their judgments of 
other risks being at the same level as the one given by the public sample. 
 
                                                 
24 . In Swedish: ”människors genetiska information”, which can be understood as the information people have 
about genetics, not information about their genetic properties. Possibly, many respondents still understood the 
statement as it was intended but some (perhaps many) may have understood it as it was formulated and could 
hence have missed the point altogether. Why should the police have access to people’s knowledge? 
  52Acceptance of GMF is unlikely in the short or medium time run. Social trust is indeed low, 
but on the other hand, social trust is not a crucial factor according to the present results. Peo-
ple doubt, instead, that Science knows well enough the crucial properties of GMF, and beliefs 
about the dangers inherent in tampering with Nature are widely spread. In addition, there are 
grave moral doubts as to the appropriateness of gene modification.  
 
The conclusions reached in other research are partially supported here, but new aspects appear 




•  In a policy related discussion, notions as to the benefits of technology and validity of 
science must be carefully attended to and explained.  
•  In discussions of consumer behavior and preferences, social trust appears to be of 
some importance. However, this is a factor of limited importance, and it has been 
overrated in previous work.  
•  In both cases, moral issues are of primary importance, and the closely related notions 
about “interference with Nature” play an important role as well. These are risk dimen-
sions. Further research on the structure and dynamics of these beliefs could be of great 
importance for understanding the attitudes and beliefs of the public with regard to 
gene technology.  
•  In contrast, the received view on risk perception, which emphasizes emotion (dread, 
affect) and ignorance (new risk) was not supported by the present data. 
•  The experts studied here differed sharply from the public as to the level of perceived 
risks and benefits, but not with regard to quality or structure of their ratings. In addi-
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